CONCLUSION
The Arab Spring has beyond any reasonable doubt proven to be a process instead of series of events. Its erratic shockwaves, still reverberating, has caught up with nations outside the Arab world. The uprisings have been broadly seen as a watershed happening which has definitely changed the region and led to seismic shift in the social contract governing the interface between the Arab ruling elites and their citizens. Nonetheless, there is an ample worry about the extent to which the uprising is likely to spread or be maintained. There is also the belief that the Arab Spring will sadly turn into a long and cruel winter.
The lack of traditions of liberalism, the tribes’ power, elites’ control of businesses, the hold on power by ethnic minorities, the high rank military personnel that cling to power, the sectarian divide and Islamic extremism will make the transformation in the region slow, bloody, and filled with hurdles. Moving ahead, pragmatism based on the rule of law ought to be the guiding force that translates the revolutionary fervor of the last few years into concrete policies that bring about political freedom and inclusive economic growth. Providing a functional democracy in the region will have profound implications for long term stability, growth and social justice. Consequently, enshrining emerging constitutions with a strong sense of political pluralism will be critical to empowering a fertile citizen-based politics. The short-lived Morsi experience in Egypt should be avoided at all costs. For the foreseeable future, post-authoritarian Arab Spring countries in transition will continue to grapple with a range of socio-political distractions ranging from economic shocks to the dilemmas of constitutional and electoral reform. Counter-revolutions, sectarianism and the consolidation of Islamist power (excepting the debacle of the Islamists of Egypt) remain distinct possibilities, each bringing further uncertainty and unintentional result.
