SUMMARY
From the discussion, the Soviet Union is wrongly perceived as the power behind the crises in the relations between Nigeria and the West, or it is concluded hastily that Soviet Union was the principal beneficiary of these breaches in relations. Neither perception is correct. Historically, upon gaining independence, Nigeria proclaimed nonalignment in her foreign policy in the sense that it would not be tied to either of the then existing ideological divides – communism (‘East’) or capitalism (‘West’). In reality, however, the stance of the country was far from being truly independent of the influence of the ideological blocs; Nigeria was openly, though with some little liberties, pro-west. This is understandable given her past colonial relationship with Great Britain. During the early years of Nigeria’s independence, from 1960-1966, the ruling elites were openly pro-west. Even after diplomatic relations were established, Nigeria limited the size of the Soviet mission and was reluctant to accept aid. It took two years after the official establishment of diplomatic relations for Nigeria to open her Embassy in Moscow. Nigerian ruling elites were mostly anti-Soviets; nevertheless, there were some political and organised labour elites who agitated for a closer tie with Russians. Communist literatures were banned and no Nigerian students were permitted to study in Moscow (though some Nigerian students still found their ways to Soviet Union by passing through other Nigeria’s neighbouring countries). 58 Despite all these frustrations and cold-shoulder of the ruling elite of Nigeria of those years, under the leadership of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, USSR continued to maintain its limited contacts and encourage the development of a neutralist foreign policy. USSR reacted cautiously to the series of political crises which plagued Nigeria during its early years of independence. In 1965 the country was on the verge of anarchy and disintegration as a result of the violence and general strike ensuing from the 1964 general elections crisis. Russia did not utilize an obvious revolutionary situation then to promote chaos and communism. Between 1964 and 1965, Russia trade with Nigeria was valued at about $5 million. The cautious and suspicious relationship with Soviet Union continued even under the military regime of General Aguiyi Ironsi (January 15, 1966 – July 30, 1966). The relations remained circumspect and cool till the end of the regime. Then on August 1 1966 came a counter-coup, with General Yakubu Gowon emerging as the new Nigerian leader. Although, cautiously the Soviet Union welcomed the new regime, especially when it released from prison Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who was serving a prison term for treason. Chief Awolowo and his Action Group party had been sympathetic to a closer pragmatic tie with the Soviet Union. Moscow also fancied the stance of the new Gowon regime on federal structure of the Nigerian state. The new stance of Russia on Nigeria and Africa in general was not however, unconnected with the exit of Comrade Nikiti Krushchev from the helm of affairs in Russia in 1964. The Soviet quickly denounced his policy approach to foreign affairs. A 59 more balanced and less ideological approach was promulgated. Towards the late 1960s, the Soviet leadership became less interested in revolution in African states and more interested in the political support of those states in their struggle to find their space in the international affairs and in the economic benefits of mutual cooperation irrespective of the nature of their internal regimes. This new Soviet pragmatic foreign policy enabled them to take the side of the Federal government of Nigeria when General Odumegwu Ojukwu in May 30 1967 proclaimed secession of the Eastern Region of the country to form a sovereign Republic of Biafra, and civil war ensued in July 6, 1967. The exigencies of the civil war forced the Federal Government of Nigeria to court USSR. The months preceding the civil war General Gowon sent a special envoy to Moscow to explain the Nigerian government’s position on the unravelling crisis and to communicate to the Soviet new leadership his (Gowon’s) administration desire to maintain and develop the friendly relation with the USSR. Following this visit, a more practical discussions centered on increased trade between the two countries were made. Such rapport between Gowon’s administration and the Soviet Union during these periods yielded a remarkable improvement in relationship of the two countries. Agreement on air services and on student exchanges and cultural affairs were negotiated and signed. Subsequently, when civil war finally broke up in this offered Moscow an opportunity to become a principal arms supplier to the federalists throughout the conflict. Nigeria needed Russia’s diplomatic and military support in its war efforts to defeat 60 Biafra. Soviet involvement, on the side of the Federalists, introduced another dimension to the conflict; it enabled Nigeria to cultivate and broaden diplomatic links with the Eastern bloc, thereby given more substance to its non-alignment foreign policy. During the civil war France and China sided with the Biafra, while Britain and USSR backed the Federal side; meanwhile United States assumed cautious neutrality. Even though the political dividends that accrued to Soviet Union as a result of siding with the Federal side could not be compared with those gained from similar roles in some of the other major conflicts in Africa, certainly there was a new impulse in Russian-Nigerian relationships. In this context, Nigeria’s relations with the USSR, particularly after the end of the civil war in 1970, were clearly based on pragmatism. After the civil war, political and economic relations with USSR became more promising. Many Soviets made machines (e.g. Lada Car, agricultural equipments and tools, etc) and home appliances found their market in Nigeria. Aeroflot Airlines started to operate regular commercial flight to Lagos. Russians became respectable people in Nigeria, most especially for their scientific achievements, which earned them successes in space Since then several joint documents have been signed between Nigeria and Soviet (Russia). These documents include Agreements on an air communication (1967), Agreement on economic and scientific and technical cooperation (1968), Agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation and exchanges (1970), Protocol on the equivalence of scientific degrees, diplomas and certificates issued and awarded by the educational institutions of the parties (1973), Agreement on economic and technical cooperation in 61 the construction of a new metallurgical enterprise in Nigeria (1976), Trade agreement (1987), Agreement on the establishment of intergovernmental commission on trade, economic and scientific and technical cooperation (1989), Protocol on political consultations (1990), and Agreement on cooperation against illegal drugs and Psychotropic substances (1999). Thus, the Nigeria- Soviet relations was given impetus by the civil war, before then Nigeria has no properly constituted basic for Soviet relation. In 1968 the Soviet Union and Nigeria signed an Agreement authorizing the USSR to established Nigeria Iron and steel industry. The agreement also provided for a Soviet loan of N120 million for the project. These agreements have led to different degrees of Soviet (Russian) involvement in Nigeria’s metallurgy, petroleum industry, geological prospecting, public health services and personnel training. Two systems of oil pipelines of 920 km with total output of 18.7 million tons per year were constructed by the USSR in 1977 - 1982 on conditions of general contract in Nigeria. Russian technical assistance in the geological prospecting works on metallurgical raw material (iron ore, coal, non-metallic raw material) were carried out in 1971 - 1983. A metallurgical complex including technical school for 652 pupils and Technical Training College for an iron and steel industry for 1325 pupils was established in 1975 in Nigerian town of Warri. In various cities of the country groups of Russian doctors worked during 1971-1980. Russia has contributed a lot to the educational development of Nigeria. More than 10 thousand Nigerians have received education in USSR/Russian educational institutions since 1960s. A metallurgical plant was established 62 in Ajaokuta to boost the industrial base of Nigerian economy (unfortunately, this goal was not fully realized before the collapse of USSR in 1991). Bilateral trade reached its peak in 1988 at a sum of about 184 million US Dollars The Murtal/Obasanjo made strenuous efforts to explain that they would not impose an ideology on the people of Nigeria and would not adopt socialism as their working philosophy even for the interim period of the 1976-9 13. Economic and fiscal measure taken by this government seemed, as it were to reassure capitalists of the predominating role in the Nigerian economy. There were also government measure which emasculated the \working class as a political, social and economic force and movement in Nigeria, and as a force independent of a government that refused to embrace Marxism. There was open hostility towards Russia in parts of Nigeria which accused it of favouring the ‘quick kill’ rather than ‘peace talks’ policy during the civil war, particularly as there was no ideological explanation for its actions in Nigeria. Russia’s role in Angola was ignored Nigeria because Nigeria concentrated on what Angolans were doing and what Nigeria did to help Angola. Nigeria made no efforts to explain Russia’s role in Angola and to present Russia as a friend of Africa. Furthermore, on Angola, and recently on the issue of Shaba province and Ethiopia-Somalia war the USSR avoided contact and collaboration with Nigeria in spite of Nigeria’s effort to effect some link-up and to influence major power roles in these essentially African problems.
