CONCLUSION
The Nigerian civil war movement in Owerri was fought from 1967 to 1970. The civil was caused by ethnic tensions between various tribes in Nigeria. The Nigerian civil war can be connected to the amalgamation in 1914 of the northern protectorate. The Nigerian civil war also known as the Biafran war was imputed in the long standing religious and ethnic tensions. Owerri being the capital of Biafra during the war was caused by many factors. Ethnic tensions in the late 1960’s rose dramatically in Nigeria. The Igbo people of Nigeria feared domination from other ethnic groups in the country. The eastern region of Nigeria declared its secession from the country on 30th may 1967, in which Enugu was the then Biafra capital. As the war started, Enugu was home to almost 140,000 residents in which majority of them were Christian Igbos. As the conflict broke out, majority started leaving the country in search of refuge deeper in Britain territory. The federal election of 1965 was heavily malpractised with the party’s view placing the Northern NNA party in power and that of 1964 placing the west’s NNDP in alliance. Both the elections of 1964 and 1965 were greeted with widespread riots which resulted in the death of many civilians. The shadows of the January and July coup of 1966 loomed in the period that preceded the civil war. Out of the five majors that have been said to plan the coup of January 1966, only one was not Ibo. While the majority of the officers that played a leading role in the 1966 coup were of Ibo origin, it still cannot be concluded that it was a tribalistic coup. An Igbo officer, Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu, from the mid-western region of Nigeria and born in the northern region, led the partially successful coup of January 15, 1966 against the federal government. Nzeogwu led the coup with a detachment of the Nigerian army. It could be said that some of Nzeogwu’s companions may have been self seeking opportunists and tribalists who saw the coup as an opportunity to achieve their ambitions. Among the officers who lost their lives in the brutal slayings of January 15th only one was Igbo – Lt.Col. Unegbe. The January coup led to the death of prominent politicians including the prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the leader of the NNA and sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the leader of the NNDP and premier of the western region, Samuel Akintola and Festus Okotie-Eboh, out of which none was Ibo. In the afternoon of January 15, all seemed to have gone well and the existing political order annihilated. The premiers who have been slated for execution were executed but the premiers of eastern region and mid-west, both Igbos were spared. This asks the question: why should the coup plotters struck only at non-igbos? why had the coup plotters executed many high ranking officers of non-igbo origin? It is still doubtful however whether major Nzeogwu had expected the coup to turn out the way it did. These questions were begun to be asked in ernest by many Nigerians when the Ironsi regime was beginning to prove disappointing. However, the new regime started well and all over Nigeria, including the north, people rejoiced at the end of the rule of corrupt politicians and hoped for a new dawn. The last of the plotters of January had been brought out of their hiding place and were detained in their various states of origin. Nzeogwu’s name became a household word overnight; however he was never to reap the benefits of power. The army had come to power but not under the direction of the coup plotters. Rather, they were arrested and detained immediately they gave themselves up to General Ironsi. Gen Ironsi who came to power in their stead, was quite incapable of any deep-reaching initiative. Ironsi was born in eastern Nigeria in 1924 to Ibo parents and joined the army in the Second World War. By 1948, he was chosen for officer in training by the British and appointed a second lieutenant in 1949. In September 1960, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and commander of the Nigerian contingent of the U.N force in the Congo. In 1961, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier in 1961 and later returned to Congo in 1964 as commander of the entire UN force with the rank of Major-General. On his return to Nigeria, he became head of the Nigerian army and the civilian regime had officially handed power to the Nigerian army on 17 January 1966. Ironsi immediately set about organizing his regime. The military regime got off to a good start. Tribunals of enquiry were set up to investigate the running of a number of public corporations. Ironsi later appointed Francis Nwokedi one-man commission to look into the establishment of administrative machinery for a united Nigeria. It was the recommendations of this commission that decree 34 was formulated. Following the January coup, Ironsi’s advert to power had been welcomed by all sections of the Nigerian community as a new national government. By the time of Ironsi’s fall, a British journalist who was closely acquainted with Nigerian affairs wrote in the guardian on 30 July, 1970, that the military government progressively has lost its image. The May 24th decree triggered of chain reactions in the north as could be foreseen. The July coup was unnecessarily bloody in execution. The coup started at Abeokuta barracks in the western region, where a Hausa captain led a group of troops into the officers’ nest at 11.p.m. and shot three eastern officers. They also sounded the call to action which brought the garrison from its sleep to line up. By day break most southern officers had been rounded up and then shot. The January coup was far from solving the political problems of Nigeria. The situation following the July coup was complex and deeply unhappy. For colonel Gowon, the week was crucial. From then on the drift to secession became steady, with Ojukwu maintaining his stand on Aburi and insisting that the original agreement be implemented. Fighting broke out in the early hours of 6 July 1967 with a prolonged federal attack on the northern side of Biafra, one aimed at the university town of Nsukka and the other at Ogoja. Owerri was a strategic location during the war for both the Nigerian government and Biafran forces. It was captured by the Biafran army in 1967 and later by the Nigerian army in 1969. The city suffered significant damage due to the frequent changing of hands from the Biafran forces to the Nigerian government. The aftermath of the civil war in Owerri was marked by significant challenges in rebuilding infrastructure, reconciling communities and addressing the social and economic impacts. Efforts were made to heal wounds through reconstruction, rehabilitation and to foster reconciliation in the community.
