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ABSTRACT
An independent judiciary is universally acknowledged as one of the most defining and definitive features of a functional democracy. Many, in fact, see it as an essential bulwark against abuse of power, authoritarianism and arbitrariness. How it functions as well as how the various stakeholders in a democratic experiment appropriate its interventions and role in the polity are critical indicators of the health or otherwise of a democracy. However, in achieving these, the Judiciary has to be independent of the other two arms of modern government. In the main, Judicial independence or independence of judiciary has its origin in the theory of separation of powers. By this theory the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary are three separate, distinct and independent branches of government; each arm is independent of the other arm in all it gets and does. As for the judiciary, the theory means both the judiciary as institution and all individual judges presiding over cases and other personnel must be able to carry out their professional responsibilities free from any influence or interference by the Executive or Legislature or any other person or institution outside or within the judiciary. Undoubtedly, it is only an independent judiciary that can competently provide the necessary checks on the excesses of other arms of government particularly on breaches of rights and freedoms of the citizenry. Balancing the weights of the Judiciary with other two heavy weights – the Executive and the Legislature – has continued to be a recurrent issue for Constitutional Law practitioners, and legal scholars. This problem has centred on the impendence of the Judiciary. Here, the independence of the judiciary takes to forms; the institutional independence and the individual independence. The judiciary cannot be said to be completely independent in any of the above aspects. This has caused major problems for our democracy. Attempt by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 to address this pressing issue of the independence of the judiciary is only but cosmetic. The composition of the National Judicial Council (NJC) is still problematic, as the processes of appointment and removal of Judges/security of tenure is the subject of political theatrics.
