Abstract
Philosophy, in practical sense, concentrates on certain matters, from a realistic point of the study, and it observes those concepts that picture and portray practicality in reality. Human actions fall under these observations of philosophy by way of ethics. Ethics observes human morality, be it by actions, purpose, intentions, means and ends. These actions could be based on reason, spirit or appetite. Appetite is spurred by desires, and satisfaction could bring about pleasure, or pleasure could bring about satisfaction. As for practical pleasure, that determination of the capacity for the desire which is caused and therefore necessarily preceded by such pleasure is called desire in the narrow sense. Since desire is natural, satisfying it is also natural. But the matter is never to forget the place of reason over the appetite, for reason metes out coordination, and this is the significant feature of humanity distinguishing it from most other physical essences.
The human person is of intrinsic and high worth to himself and to others. In fact, humanity itself is a dignity; for a man is not to be used by anyone as a means (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not men and yet can be used, and so over all things. This is the purpose of this work, that man might always bear in mind his intrinsic worth, and that he is not a tool to be subjected to his sexual desires, even to the point of reducing himself to his animal instincts. Whether personally or by partnership, he should not allow himself to be subjected to the biddings of pleasure, be it his or another’s.
The one who is weak should seek a system of duties based on inner freedom or freedom in the act of choice itself, for freedom is that of the capacity of pure reason to be of itself practical. Here it is a question of the moral disposition of the individual, of the virtues to be acquired and the vices to be avoided. The virtue to be acquired here is self-control, and the vice to be avoided is submission to lust. Natural desires could influence a person’s capacity for choice and could, in turn, be counteracted by measures directed to their natural aversions. But his actions will be in question. It is, therefore, necessary to uphold a standard in sexual behaviour, standards to be practised and kept for a continuous period of time: a standard of sexual morality according to Kant and Aquinas; for sexual desire is natural, but the use of the sexual organs is also a matter of moral necessity. This should however be done voluntarily, and gradually. For certain habits cannot easily be changed, they have become part of the person. But just as the habit was learned, it can also be unlearned, after all, habits are like accidents hanging upon a substance; though the accidents be part of the substance, it is still not in the intrinsic nature of the substance. It is not a question of single actions but of lasting dispositions, and the individual, his disposition to fulfill his duties from duty — is of crucial importance.
