ABSTRACT
This Study examines the Aburi Accord and its significance to Nigeria Civil war. The Issues that culminated into the Aburi Accord and eventually the Nigeria Civil war can be traceable to the structure and nature of administration that existed in Nigeria even from the colonial era.1 Precisely, on January 1, 1914, Britain, a former colonial power gave birth to the nation, Nigeria through series of diplomatic initiatives and conquests that led to the amalgamation of the ethnically and culturally diverse Northern and Southern Protectorates. This explains that Nigeria became a British colony as a result of the diplomacy of imperialism than a matter of choice for any of the peoples that were to be enclosed within this plan and structure that came to be recognized and administered as one territorial unit called Nigeria.2
From the time of its amalgamation in 1914, to independence in 1960 and beyond, the continue to struggle in an attempt to relate together in Unity. The Incompatibility among the amalgamated group made this difficult or impossible, this led to series of issues that climaxed into the civil war that took place between 1967-1970.3 The Incompatibility among the various groups was further aggravated by political disturbances that engulfed the Nigerian especially the early post-independence years. Threatened by a state of total collapse after a period of bloody military coups, the Nigerian Army went to Aburi in search of peace, the failure to implement Aburi ratifications regarding the country’s unity, resulted in the 30 months civil war.4
After several unfruitful attempts to bring (Gowon and Ojukwu) to the negotiating table, Aburi, a more secured venue, in Ghana, was mutually agreed upon by both parties while General Ankrah offered to host them in a bid to restore the country from the brink of war. The agreement reached was however interpreted differently by the negotiating parties which eventually made its implementation difficult and led to the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil war. It conjures the meaning that a full implementation of the Aburi Accord could have saved the country a great deal of human and material resources lost during the civil war.5
The agreement practically reflected a huge concession on the part of the Gowon-led Federal Military Government during the conference at Aburi, so much that the Federal government was not willing to implement all that had been agreed but came up with a partial implementation programme through the promulgation of Decree No. 8 of March 17, 1967 which emphasized a major decentralization of the country’s administration as recommended in the Accord.6 By this decree, the regions were returned to their pre-January 15, 1966 status but in a clear contrast to Aburi provisions, with a clause on the ‘emergency powers’ of the Head of the Federal Military Government. In line with the “concessions” embodied in Decree No.8, the Federal Military Government paid the Sum of £500,000 to the government of the Eastern Region as first instalment for the rehabilitation of its dislocated persons.7 The Federal side also publicly acknowledged the deaths of Ironsi and Fajuyi and the remains of both given a State burial.
Despite the above concessions, the Governor of the Eastern Region, Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu totally rejected the federal government promulgation on the Aburi agreement citing its ‘inclusion of the emergency powers’ of the Head of State which was not part and parcel of the initial agreement. He knew that any emergency powers arrogated to the Head of State was a concentration of powers in the hands of the Head of State which was not what he (Ojukwu) bargained for at Aburi. Contrary to Ojukwu’s claims, his secretary, N.U. Akpan writing one year after the demise of the Biafra, noted that Decree No. 8 had “faithfully implemented the Aburi decisions” thus rendering Ojukwu’s call for total implementation unjustifiable. It could be argued that Ojukwu, using the Aburi partial implementation as a smoke-screen, had other plans which could only thrive in the event of outright implementation. The disagreement that trailed the post-Aburi meeting was a turning point in the role of Aburi Accord to serve as a peace instrument.
Scholars have continued to identify the causes of the breakdown of the Aburi Accord and the outbreak of the Nigerian Civil War from 1967-1970. These factors which include: political, social, economic, religious, etc. are interwoven but the role of Aburi Accord in starting the war was, more often than not, considered the last step that propelled the outbreak of the war. In fact, in the statement reflected in Obasanjo’s book “My Command” revealed that “Aburi was the last ditch of effort to save Nigeria from collapse”. Other scholars have agreed to this same statement by referring to the Aburi Accord as the last gap in that circle of conflict. The major fault line of the Accord was the policy frame itself which was in very many ways considered by its formulators as significant and strategic to the survival of Nigeria, but the reality was that the Aburi Accord was greeted with mixed feelings.
