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ABSTRACT
This study examined the test for information asymmetry problems in Nigeria National Health Insurance Scheme. To achieve the objectives of this project, primary data were gathered and used through the aim of questionnaires which were distributed to 300 respondents in Lagos, Edo state and Delta state. The study employed the use of cross-sectional survey design and the data were analysed using SPSS. From the result obtained, it was observed that there is a high incidence of moral hazard in the Nigerian National Health Insurance Scheme, information asymmetry issues lead to moral hazard in the Nigerian Health Insurance Market. moral hazard involves a situation whereby holders of insurance policy are encouraged to display behavioral patterns that they will not otherwise display if they do not have insurance policy. there is high issue of adverse selection in the Nigerian National Health Insurance Scheme. information asymmetry issues lead to adverse selection in the Nigerian Health Insurance Market.
