ABSTRACT
The Nigeria-Cameroon conflict over the Bakassi Peninsula primarily revolved around a territorial dispute in the Gulf of Guinea region. The conflict spanned several decades and was marked by diplomatic negotiations, legal proceedings, and occasional violence. The dispute centered on the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula, a strategically important area rich in natural resources and fisheries. Nigeria and Cameroon both claimed historical rights to the territory, and the dispute escalated in the 1990s when tensions increased. The general points which emerge from an analysis of the boundary and territorial disputes between Nigeria and Cameroun may be briefly highlighted.1
First, it is clear that there is a link between authoritarian repressive regimes and a high proclivity to resolve international disputes by the use of violent means. Regimes that use violence to repress political opponents at the domestic level tend to reproduce themselves externally through violent diplomacy. It was under the highly repressive regimes of Babangida' and Abacha in Nigeria and Paul Biya in Cameroun that the conflict between the two countries arising from the dispute over boundaries and territories almost degenerated to violent confrontations. Thus, Democracy, or at least relatively non-authoritarian civilian rule, is therefore a better domestic political foundation for international peace than military rule.2
Secondly, economic interests, especially stakes in some valuable natural resources, rather than concern for human lives and consideration for human welfare, underlie most international conflicts. Even when other interests or motives are presented as issues in dispute, often, but not always, the hidden and real motivating factors are economic, in particular contention over some natural resources. In the case under study, it was the discovery of crude oil in the disputed territory in 1967 that heightened the interests of the governments of Nigeria and Cameroun in the disputed territories especially the Bakassi penninsula.3
The livelihood opportunities of the people in the area, specifically their fishing rights and their general welfare have been and remain, of little interest to successive governments in Nigeria and Cameroun. Even the question of whether the people in the area wish to be Nigerians or Camerounians do not bother the governments of the two countries much. This explains why the Nigerian government readily accepted the results of the plebiscite in Southern Cameroun in 1961 but rejected the verdict of the ICJ in 2002 even when it secured a substantial territory and gained some people from the ruling. The Bakassi peninsula overshadows all the other territories in value because it is an oil-bearing territory.4
Third, the choice of conflict-resolution strategies by the contending parties is usually predicated on both their relative strengths and the perceived justness (or lack of merit) of their causes. Strong contending parties with weak cases avoid arbitration, judicial settlements, and collective security and go for bilateral negotiations, conciliation and self-enforcement. But, weak contending parties with strong cases tend to adopt the reverse system of preference as conflict resolution strategies and mechanisms. It is to be expected therefore that it is Cameroun, and not Nigeria, that will, in future, resort more frequently and readily to the United Nations organs and agencies, while Nigeria will choose to settle the matter by bilateral talks. Cameroun is unlikely to go to war on the matter and the probability of resorting to the use of force by Nigeria is not high.5
Fourth, pressure from the real victims of conflicts, that is, those whose livelihood chances are directly threatened by the conflict is often critical in bringing about a resolution of the conflict. Conversely, those who indirectly benefit materially from such conflicts, for example, oil-prospecting companies operating on both side of the divide and potential suppliers of arms and ammunitions, local and international, constitute obstacles to peaceful conflict resolution. It is, therefore important to scrutinize closely the real interests of all actors now urging Nigeria not to accept the verdict of the ICJ on the matter, and those putting pressure on the Republic of Cameroun to seize the territory, by force, from Nigeria.6
Fifth, enduring conflict resolution must be based on clear, generally accepted principles, which serve, promote and improve human welfare, not those which merely satisfy the interests of abstract entities, such as states. In this respect, the superiority of human rights norms over the principle of raison d'etat is to be stressed by that token, democratic consultation with the real, actual or potential victims of conflicts. The majority of the people in the disputed territories is more efficacious than reliance on the views of the indirect beneficiaries of the continuation of the conflicts or conflict situations.7
Precisely sixteen years ago, the International Court of Justice gave a ruling in favour of Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula. This judgment brought about mixed reactions particularly to Nigerians because several years after its ruling, the Bakassi returnees are yet to have fully settled. As opposed to other similar court cases ruling by the ICJ like that of Nicaragua and Colombia in favour of Nicaragua, both states finally settled the case by considering the people found in the disputed area. This to an extent averted an unforeseen damage and hardship for the Colombians.8 It is thus on this basis that Nigerians would have thought that the verdict taken would have considered the sensitivity of the case.
On this note, the study recommends from findings of research carried out that, the Nigerian government should alleviate the living condition of the Bakassi returnees by giving them better living condition and an improved means of livelihood.9
During an interview with Felix Osaige, he stated that the bakassi question remains a lost to Nigeria, adding that Bakassi is originally part of Calabar, Nigeria. However, the ICJ in its own wisdom ruled in favour of Cameroon and now so many people lost their possession.10
Ese A. Odion argued that the ICJ resolution was bias, fingering the French influence as the major preponderance. According to her, Cameroon had the backing and support of the French, a superpower which made the case went on to their favor.11
Cocobassey Dan Obong stated that the unfortunate World Court verdict which ceded Bakassi to Cameroon was without regard to the principle of impartiality, justice, equity and fair play. He stressed that the composition of the court was lopsided and not properly calculated to reflect fairness on the part of some of the judges. He further argued that the inclusion of judges from Colonial Masters countries was not good enough and might have influenced the ICJ decision especially that of France from where the lead judge came.12
However, in contrast, Charles Ehisienmen, blamed the former Nigerian leader, General Yakubu Gowon, for ceding the territory to Cameroon. He argued that leaders who exceeded their authorized powers should face consequences for their actions. He also emphasized that Gowon had no authority over Bakassi at the time of the handover, and the government in place was unconstitutional. Consequently, he believed that the agreement with Cameroon did not represent the will of the people.13
Conclusively, the Bakassi Conflict remains a watershed event in the history of Cameroon and Nigeria relations, nearly igniting a major military confrontation between the two neighbours. Despite the fact that there was no former declaration of war the conflict led to loss of lives of Civilian and military personnel. However, the ICJ verdict opens the pact for a peaceful resolution, which was finalized and sealed by skillful negotiation. But peace came with a price and created an open wound that is still fresh in the heart many till date.
