EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FALLIBILISM IN CHARLE’S SANDERS PEIRCE PRAGMATIC PHILOSOPHY

ABSTRACT

The research exposes, and critically analyses Peirce’s fallibilism as an account for the theory of knowledge and structure of epistemic justification. The work held that traditional knowledge has always been understood as the impossibility for error and absolute certainty is required for the justification that backs such knowledge. Oftentimes when we claim to have knowledge, we realize later that we were wrong even though such “false knowledge” has served us well. Thus, it is as though we can know, given some conditions in a specific time and at another time, not know, in the same conditions. The study poses a big challenge to the whole edifice of epistemology. To this end, the research considers the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, which states that we have no guarantee that any particular belief will ever be immune from the need to be revised – that is to say, that indubitable knowledge is impossible, only its approximation is tenable – as a proactive measure to deal with such a challenge. Accordingly, this theory accommodates the possibility for error while at the same time claim some degree of certainty – one that is not indubitable. Hence, using the philosophical tools of analysis, the research pointed out that the Peirce’s fallibilism blurs the line between knowing and not-knowing amongst other issues. Nonetheless, the research submits that, despite Peirce’s fallibilism needing more modification, it offers a better account of knowledge and justification than any other alternative theory and it (Peirce’s fallibilism) has in fact, modified some of these other alternative theories.